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Recent years registered a renewed interest in social interactions.
However, due to some well-known identiﬁcation problems, empirical
estimation of peer eﬀects remains quite problematic. To overcome
problems of this kind, a database providing detailed information on the
sequential structure of choices is analyzed. Observations refer to the
deposit of money in a personal account devoted to the purchase of food
at campus refectories. A clear tendency to conform to directly observed
deposits is registered in the data. Furthermore, higher conformism is
observed among mutually acquainted individuals.
Keywords: Social interactions; Conformism; Social Proximity; Food
Purchase
1 Introduction
According to standard economic analysis decision making is a goal-oriented
process performed by individuals in isolation. Within this framework in-
teractions among economic agents are exclusively mediated by the market.
This approach has been subject to critiques because of its neglection of
interactions happening outside the market insitution(Granovetter, 1985).
To account for interactions of this kind, network analysis has been succes-
fully applied to various domains having relevant economic contents. As an
example, consider the the relevance of networks and connections that has
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been evidenced by a large number of job market studies (for a review see,
Ioannides and Datcher Loury, 2004). In addition to this, recent theoretical
contributions have advanced the understanding of dynamics associated to
social interactions over networks (see among others, Bala and Goyal, 2000).
The study of interactions happening outside the market institution calls
for an appraisal of such interactions. Among the various channels that may
aﬀect the actions of others, a relevant role is played by the interactions at the
preference level (Manski, 2000). Interactions of this kind are observed when
the relative desirability of alternatives depends on choices undertaken by
other subjects. Casual empirical observations seem to conﬁrm that people
tend to conform to actions of subjects in their reference group (e.g., dress
codes). It may well be that shared habits and tastes were the outcome of
interactions at the preference level. Unfortunately, empirical estimation of
such peer eﬀects remains quite problematic. Manski (1993) illustrates vari-
ous problems of identiﬁcation encountered when trying to estimate whether
the average characteristics of a group inﬂuence individual behavior. In par-
ticular, some complications due to the simultaneity of peer inﬂuences and
to endogenous matching are investigated. The author shows that, even in
the best-case scenario, employing a linear model only allows to estimate a
composite social eﬀect. In other terms, it will generally not be possible to
separately identify the eﬀects springing from genuine endogenous interac-
tion and the eﬀects related to the exogenous characteristics of the agents.
Diﬀerent strategies have been pursued to overcome these identiﬁcation is-
sues (for a review see, Soetevent, 2006). Nevertheless, clean estimation
of endogenous social eﬀects with happenstance ﬁeld data remains an open
task.
The present study aims at overcoming problems of identiﬁcation by con-
sidering a dataset of discrete choices characterized by unidirectional local
interactions. In addition, a measure of mutual acquaintance is introduced
to control for potential eﬀects related to endogenous matching. In more de-
tails, the observed discrete choice refers to the voluntary commitment of a
certain amount of wealth to future food consumption. The observations are
collected at the campus refectories of the University of Trento, Italy. Social
connections are identiﬁed by computing the number of meetings at the cam-3
pus refectory. The issue of social interactions is addressed by considering
the impact of the commitment choice of a subject in the queue for lunch
(i.e., the leader) on the same choice of the immediately following subject in
the queue (i.e., the follower).
A renewed interest on the dynamics of the demand side of the economic
system (Witt, 2001) has evidenced some crucial aspects connecting con-
sumption and social structures. This connection is made explicit by Aversi
et al. (1999), who stress the role of social interaction in building consump-
tion habits and routines. The link between identity, social structures (e.g.,
friendship, group membership) and consumption has traditionally been ne-
glected by economic theory. Stable and context-independent preferences are
commonly assumed. In the present study the presence of social connections
enters the analysis both as a control measure to identify endogenous social
interactions in random matched couples but also as an observation variable
adding a further dimension to the study of social spillovers.
Before reviewing some applied works on social spillovers, it is useful
to point out some basic commonalities shared by formal models of social
interaction (Glaeser and Scheinkman, 2003). First, the utility function of
an individual accounts both for individual actions and actions of peers in
a reference group. Second, a measure of social proximity provides links
between diﬀerent subjects and, ﬁnally, interactions can be either local or
global.
Literature Review
Models of social interaction have been applied to various kinds of decisions
having relevant economic consequences. With reference to social learning
and the introduction of a new technology or technique, Conley and Udry
(2000), show that farmers in Ghana tend to learn and adopt successful prac-
tices implemented by their neighbors. Miguel and Kremer (2003) considers
the diﬀusion of a deworming drug in Kenya. The study points out the
presence of endogenous social eﬀects in the form of negative social learn-
ing. Indeed, individuals with more social connections were less likely to
take the deworming drug because they were told by peers that the drug was
ineﬀective.4
Relevant contributions on social spillovers were developed with reference
to preferences and attitudes towards other members of the reference com-
munity. Relying on aggregate data, Glaeser et al. (1996) show the relevance
of social interaction in criminal behavior. In particular, social interactions
seem to heavily aﬀect the behavior of young individuals and to impact more
on certain criminal activities. As the present study is focused on choices
made by undergraduate students, the work of Sacerdote (2001) is of par-
ticular interest. The author measures peer eﬀects among students who are
randomly assigned to a college dormitory. What emerges from the empirical
analysis, is that strong peer eﬀects are identiﬁed in exam performances and
in decisions involving social life. Instead, no similar eﬀects are registered in
choices having long-term consequences (e.g., the choice of the major).
A growing ﬁeld of inquiry about social interactions is that on intertem-
poral choices. Duﬂo and Saez (2002) show that, strong social eﬀects are
present when searching for information about a pension plan. In the study
of Sorensen (200x) individual longitudinal data are collected. The empiri-
cal investigation starts from the observation that health plan decisions are
highly correlated at the department level. By controlling for possible unob-
servable ﬁxed eﬀects at the department level, the author shows that decisions
of the coworkers are important in the choice of health plan but not dominant
when compared to other factors.
Interesting insights on the interdependence between diﬀerent agents can
be found in other ﬁelds than economics. In animal communities, commu-
nication of preferences and social learning seem to play a fundamental role
in food gathering and other basic behaviors. Galef (1996) presents a review
of social learning studies based on rats. An interesting ﬁnding of a labora-
tory experiment is that observing other rats eating a speciﬁc kind of food
induces a preference for that food in the observer. The evolutionary expla-
nation given by the author is that food which is eaten by some conspeciﬁc
is less likely to be poisoned. Concerning the impact of social learning on
humans, Henrich and McElreath (2003) consider the interaction between
individual learning and social learning (imitation) and deﬁne some optimal
patterns of imitation. According to the authors, individual learning is fun-
damental to bring innovation into a society but social learning can foster5
the diﬀusion of innovation. The relevance of social learning in the form of
imitation has been conﬁrmed also by recent research in neuroscience, both
in humans (Iacoboni et al., 1999) and in primates (Subiaul et al., 2004).
What emerges from this brief literature review is that social interactions,
although diﬃcult to identify, are likely to inﬂuence individual behavior in
various decisional tasks. The regression analysis reported in section 3.4
provides strong support to the hypothesis that endogenous social eﬀects
are the leading determinant of the decision to commit part of the personal
budget to nutritional purposes. The quantitative analysis evidences also that
stronger conformism is registered among subjects who are socially connected
by mutual acquaintance. The remaining of the work is organized as follows.
Section 2 illustrates how data employed in the analysis were collected and
organized; Section 3 reviews some identiﬁcation issues presents the results
of the quantitative analysis; Section 4 discusses results and concludes.
2 Method
2.1 Data Source
Data employed in the analysis were collected by computerized systems lo-
cated at diﬀerent refectories of the University of Trento and were recorded
by a central electronic database.1 Each student of the University of Trento
is provided with a personal ID card. The name of the owner and his/her
own picture are printed on the card (see Figure 1). The card allows the
owner to access various facilities at the campus. However, the present study
considers only the purchase of meals at the campus refectories.
Figure 1 about here
The standard procedure to buy a meal at the campus refectories can be
decomposed into diﬀerent stages (see Figure 1). First, the customers enter
the refectory and form a queue when approaching the counter where food is
served by the refectory’s employees. Second, the customers choose their meal
1Data were kindly provided to the author by the oﬃce which manages accommodation
services (e.g., housing, meals, scholarships) to the students of the University of Trento,
Italy.6
at the counter and approach the cash desk preserving their relative position
in the queue. Finally, the customers pay for their meal. The subject who
is paying is not isolated from following subjects in the queue. Due to the
electronic card various information are collected at the payment stage. In
particular, the timing of the money transfer, the terminal ID number, the
amount transferred, the type of operation and the ID of the customer are
stored in the database.
Cash transfer can exceed the amount due for the meal. Cash in excess
is either returned or stored on a private account which can be accessed with
the personal ID card. Money deposited in the meal account can be spent
only at the cash desk and only to buy meals at the refectory.
The deposit act, while being of small scale, presents some interesting
features from an economic point of view. First, it is important to notice
the qualitative content of the decision making. The act of depositing wealth
in the account involves intertemporal allocation of consumption resources.
Second, even if direct support cannot be provided here, it seems plausible
to assume that Italian undergraduate student face budget constraints that
render the choices considered here relevant to them, even if small in absolute
terms.
Quantitative analysis presented in section 3 focuses on decisions to de-
posit cash in the personal meal account. Two important aspects of the
observational unit must be highlighted. First of all, at the time when data
were collected the routine described above was the only procedure available
to deposit money in the personal meal account. Moreover, wealth deposited
was not rewarded with any kind of interest rate. Thus, by depositing money
on the card customers face an opportunity cost. However, three main con-
current motivational factors can, at least partially, explain deposits.
First, payment by card can reduce transactions costs associated with
payment by cash. Indeed, payment by cash might entail a cost for subjects
as it forces to pay attention on change returned by the cashier. People
may prefer to pay their meals through an easy swipe of the electronic card.
Moreover payment through the electronic card is faster than payment in
cash.7
Second, payment by card provides an implicit insurance. In fact, wealth
deposited on the card is recorded in a database. If the card is lost or stolen,
money can still be recovered through the payment of a cost due to the
re-issue of a new card. This feature provides the card with an insurance
advantage which is not present when transactions are made by cash.
Finally, the commitment of money to nutritional purposes provides an
eﬀective self-control device. Food consumption may be perceived as hav-
ing positive impact on long-term health status but as being less desirable
in the short term when compared with other kinds of activities having a
negative impact on health status. In this perspective, the meal account can
be thought of as a commitment technology for sophisticated subjects with
self-control problems (O’Donoghue and Rabin, 2000).
The motivational factors described above may aﬀect decisions in the task
considered. However, focus of the present work is on the impact that ac-
tions of relevant others have on actions of an agent. Particular attention
will be paid to conformism. In simple terms, this can be deﬁned as the
tendency to act in a certain way because other individuals in a reference
group are behaving that way. Various features of the decision process under
examination suggest that peer eﬀects are likely to play a relevant role in
explaining observed behavior. Indeed, decisions are observed just after the
introduction of the meal account. This implies that subjects do not main-
tain strong prior beliefs about the meal account and that the task is not a
routinized activity. Both this conditions seem likely to favor the imitation of
others’ actions. A further element that can favor endogenous social eﬀects
is the fact that the decision makers all belong to a pool of university stu-
dents. Various studies in the tradition of Social Identity Theory (Tajfel and
Turner, 1986) highlighted the relevance of shared characteristics in the for-
mation of beliefs about others’ actions. It emerged, among other ﬁndings,
that higher degrees of perceived similarity induce a better opinion about
features and actions of the others (Turner, 1985). Thus, a psychological
mechanism of this kind may also favor the transmission of behavior in the
population under examination.
The quantitative analysis reported in Section 3.4, while controlling for
additional explanatory factors, will explicitly address the issue of replication8
of the behavior of relevant others.
2.2 Mutual Acquaintance
A measure of mutual acquaintance is crucial to the analysis of the deposit
act. This variable provides a clear identiﬁcation of social connections in
the dataset. Couples of subjects are characterized by mutual acquaintance
if, during the time window considered here,2 individuals in the couple are
“close” in the queue at least a certain number of times.
In more details, the following strategy was pursued to identify mutual
acquaintance. First, following the temporal order in the database, each
subject is progressively kept as reference and individuals preceding her at the
cash desk of k seconds and subjects following her of k seconds are recorded in
an array.3 The same operation is repeated each time the same ID shows up
in the database. All the individuals met by the targeted subject are recorded
in the array. The same procedure is applied to each subject in the database.
Second, an index of social connection is created by counting the number of
encounters between a subject and all the the other subjects in the dataset.
The same operation is repeated for each subject. As an example, if subject
i and subject j met four times, their index of social connection is equal to 4.
Finally, when the index of social connection is higher than a given threshold
h the two subjects are classiﬁed as being mutually acquainted.
Some numerical simulations were performed to deﬁne the threshold h
of encounters that identiﬁes mutual acquaintance (see Figure 2). In more
details, an ordered array of artiﬁcial individual observations (Y ) is built
by randomly sampling (without re-introduction) elements from the array of
empirical individual observations. Then, a series of random draws of length
equal to the length of Y is recorded in an ordered array X. The draws are
performed on a uniform distribution. An array of timing T of each observa-
tions in y ∈ Y is deﬁned by adding the corresponding x ∈ X to the timing
of the preceding observation. Concerning the lower boundary condition, the
2Data collected refer to the period going from February 9
th, 2004 to December 31
st,
2004.
3Two diﬀerent maximum intervals between the operations were employed (i.e., k = 60
and k = 120). The regression analysis reported in Section 3.4 is based on data obtained
from k = 60.9
timing of the ﬁrst observation in Y is set equal to the corresponding element
in X.4
To gain in the understanding of the dynamics governing meetings in the
queue for lunch, two diﬀerent sets of simulations are computed by varying
the support of the distribution from which each x ∈ X is randomly drawn. In
particular, two distinct uniform distributions are employed and two distinct
arrays X obtained (i.e., X1 v U(1,31) and X2 v U(1,15)). Given that the
smaller k is equal to 60, both speciﬁcations imply that two consecutive meals
produce an encounter between the two subjects. The average and the median
time interval between consecutive choices in the emprical distribution are
equal to 76.524 and 36, respectively. This implies that the likelihood of the
encounters between couples of subjects is, overall, higher in the simulations
than in the real sample. This penalizing assumption aims at enriching the
comparison between real data and randomly generated sequences.
Figure 2 about here
Figure 2 portrays part of the cumulative distribution of the index of social
connection in the simulations and in the real values. Only couples of subjects
with at least one meeting are considered. To preserve the informativeness of
Figure 2, the frequency of unitary meetings in real values has been omitted
from the graph. The frequency amounts to 0.7752 for the distribution with
k=60 and 0.7461 for the distribution with k=120.5
From Figure 2 it emerges a strong diﬀerence between real and simulated
data and a very low diﬀerences among simulated values. Simulated distribu-
tions are almost completely characterized by single encounters and the mass
of the distribution is accumulated on values lower than 3. On the other side,
the index of social connection in real data extends over values greater than 1
and single encounters do not absorb the whole distribution of observations.
From a comparison between simulated and real values, it seems plausible
4As an example, if Y = {10,2,5} and X = {20,120,80} the array of timing is T =
{20,140,220}.
5The number of encounters in Figure 2 is much greater than the number of subjects.
This is due to the fact that each subject can have multiple encounters during the life
span of the database. Moreover, an encounter is not computed only with respect to the
subject immediately close in the queue but with respect to all the subjects in the time
range deﬁned by k.10
to argue that repeated encounters in real data are not the byproduct of a
random matching process but, instead, are a reliable signal of the existence
of social connections.
Relying on the evidence collected from the distribution of meetings ob-
tained from simulated values, the threshold h is set equal to 4 when k = 60
and equal to 7 when k = 120. Some robustness checks on the plausibility of
this threshold will be presented in the analysis below.
3 Data Analysis
3.1 Identiﬁcation Issues
The seminal work of Schelling (1973) brought economists’ attention to in-
teractions between individual discrete choices. In a recent contribution on
this issue, Brock and Durlauf (2001) consider the properties of generalized
logistic models in the presence of social interactions. In models of this kind,
the introduction of a utility component related to the actions of others in
the individual utility function solves the problem of social interactions. The
assumptions underlying the Brock and Durlauf’s formal model are quite
strong and likely to limit the applications to real-world interactions. Evans
et al. (1992) present an empirical estimation of peer group eﬀects among
teenagers regarding teenage pregnancy and school dropout. To control for
problems of self selection, a simultaneous equation model, instead of a sin-
gle equation model, is employed in the analysis. The estimation strategy
followed shows that, when the observed behavior is not independent of the
choice of joining a reference group, a single equation model is likely to over-
estimate the impact of group’s characteristics on observed decisions. As
already mentioned, Manski (1993) focuses on a fundamental problem of em-
pirical estimation of endogenous social eﬀects. Indeed, when the behavior
of a subject is linked to the average characteristics of a reference group,
a problem in the identiﬁcation of the causality of social spillovers emerges
(i.e., reﬂection problem). The characteristics of the subjects are deﬁned by
the average characteristics of the group which, in turn, inﬂuence group’s
characteristics. It follows that, even under conditions of independence in
the matching of the population, only a composite social eﬀect is identiﬁable.11
Endogenous eﬀects (i.e., originating from the behavior of the group) can-
not be disentangled from exogenous eﬀects (i.e., originating from exogenous
characteristics of the group) or correlated eﬀects (i.e., originating from the
similarities among group members).
The database employed here oﬀers a unique opportunity to overcome
problems of simultaneity and endogenous matching. In fact, endogenous
eﬀects are not estimated with reference to a summary measure of the char-
acteristics of the reference group but, with reference to a predetermined and
directly observed choice of another subject (i.e., the leader). This represents
a valid solution for the reﬂection problem. Indeed, the subject whose choice
is considered can only observe the action of the other subject and not inﬂu-
ence it. The causality of social interaction is thus embedded in the physical
structure of the decision making process which only allows for spillovers from
the action of the leader to the action of the follower.
As already noticed, when matching is not random, endogenous eﬀects
cannot be distinguished from eﬀects due to exogenous characteristics of the
subjects or from unobservable common characteristics (e.g., tastes and mo-
tivations). To control for the consequences of deliberative matching, an
interaction term between the action of the leader and the social connection
between the leader and the follower is introduced in the analysis. The pres-
ence of the interaction term allows to assess conformism only with reference
to the choices observed under a condition of pseudo-experimental matching.
Finally, it is important to remark that the possibility of eﬀectively identify
endogenous social eﬀects relies on the fundamental assumption that choices
are not publicly revealed before the associated action becomes observable.
The robustness check reported in Section 3.4.1 seems to support this as-
sumption.
3.2 Description of the Variables
The dependent variable of the analysis (Follower Deposit, FD) refers to the
act of deposit performed by a follower. It is a dichotomous variable, equal
to 1 when more or equal than 10 EURO are deposited in the meal account
in correspondence to the ﬁrst transfer after the introduction of the account
technology. Otherwise, it is equal to 0. As the maximum price for a meal is12
3.10 EURO, a deposit allows to purchase at least 3 meals at the refectory.
Concerning the explanatory variables, the following measures are em-
ployed in the analysis.
Deposit Leader (DL) is equal to 1 when the leader deposits more than
10 EURO in the meal account in correspondence to the ﬁrst transfer after
the introduction of the account technology. Otherwise, it is equal to 0. The
estimated coeﬃcient associated to this variable reﬂects the endogenous social
spillovers originating from the action of the leader and directed towards the
action of the follower.
Acquaintance (A): assumes value 1 when the follower and the leader are
mutually acquainted. When no signiﬁcant social connection is present the
value assumes value 0. The relationship between each subject of the couple
of decision makers is built following the procedure described in section 2.2
for the deﬁnition of aij. In the main regression, the parameter h is set equal
to 4. Thus, when subjects meet more than 4 times during the time window
covered by the database the variable acquaintance assumes value 1, while it
is equal to 0 in the remaining cases.
The interaction term Deposit Leader × Acquaintance (DL*A) is equal to
1 when an amount equal or greater than 10 EURO is deposited by the leader
and the leader is acquainted with the follower. Given that this variable is
an interaction between the two covariates previously described, it is equal
to 0 when the leader is not acquainted with the follower and/or the leader
does not deposit an amount equal or greater than 10 EURO in the meal
account. The variable provides a control on the interactions between sub-
jects that are not randomly matched. As stated before, this variable makes
it possible to disentangle genuine endogenous eﬀects from exogenous and
correlated eﬀects. However, the coeﬃcient of the interaction term provides
only a compound estimation of eﬀects that are to be ascribed to exogenous
characteristics of the leader and to the unobservable characteristics shared
by the leader and the follower.
International student (IS) is equal to 1 when the individual is an inter-
national student and equal to 0 when the student is Italian.
Male (M) accounts for the gender of the subject (i.e., 1=male, 0=female)
Total Transactions (TT) registers the total number of transactions per-13
formed by the subject over the time span of the dataset. It is used as a
proxy for the number of meal purchases that the decision maker expects to
make at the time of the introduction of the meal account. This variable is
likely to play a fundamental role in the deﬁnition of motivational factors
detailed in Section 2. Indeed, transaction costs, self-control problems and
insurance eﬀects associated to the use of the card are all positively aﬀected
by the frequency of meals purchased at the refectory.
Week beginning (WB) is equal to 1 when the day of the registered trans-
action is the beginning of the working week and 0 otherwise. The variable
controls for a potential increase in the deposits at the beginning of the work-
ing week.
3.3 Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics about the amount of money associated to a deposit act
are reported in Table 1.
Table 1 about here
Table 1 shows that the vast majority (88.60%) of money transfers are
not associated with a deposit act. The average amount deposited amounts
is about 14 EURO and the median of the distribution of deposits is equal
to the threshold value of 10 EURO. This is likely to signal the presence of
extreme values in the deposits. For transfers not associated with a deposit
act, the median and the average values of the distribution are very similar.
In particular, the former is equal to the price of the cheapest meal available
at the campus refectory.
The regression analysis reported in Section 3.4 focuses on the interac-
tion between the deposit act of the leader and the same act of the follower.
A further dimension, namely mutual acquaintance, is considered to check
whether social connections are likely to inﬂuence patterns of conformism.
The following tables present some descriptive measures referred to the sam-
ple employed in the regression analysis. The sample is built by considering
only the ﬁrst decision of each subject after the introduction of the technol-
ogy. Moreover, only transactions performed by a follower within 60 seconds14
from the action of the leader are considered. Encounters are deﬁned by
setting k = 60.6 Finally, mutual acquaintance is deﬁned by setting h = 4.
Table 2 reports the distribution of the deposit acts of the followers (i.e.,
FD) conditional on the status of mutual acquaintance between followers
and matched leaders (0 = stranger, 1 = mutual acquaintance).
Table 2 about here
From Table 2 it emerges that about 25% of transactions in our sample are
performed by followers being acquainted with the matched leader. Deposit is
relatively more frequent among these subjects (18.17%) than among subjects
matched with a stranger (9.15%). However, given the higher frequency of
matching with a stranger, the majority of deposits (60.30%) are performed
by followers matched with a stranger .
The main concern of the present work is the identiﬁcation of endogenous
interactions between actions of the leaders and actions of the followers. At
this aim, before approaching the regression analysis, it is useful to present
some indicators of the correlation between decisions of interacting couples
in the regression sample. A positive and statistically signiﬁcant correlation
between decisions of the leader and decisions of the follower is registered
(Spearman’s rho = 0.2810, p-value = 0.000). In particular, a stronger corre-
lation is registered between subjects linked by mutual acquaintance (Spear-
man’s rho = 0.4589, p-value = 0.000) than between strangers (Spearman’s
rho = 0.1658, p-value = 0.000). Table 3 presents the cross correlation in-
dexes of the explanatory variables employed in the regression analysis of
Section 3.4.
Table 3 about here
In general, the level of correlation between explanatory variables is low.
In particular, total transactions are positively correlated with some of the
explanatory variables, but, except for the variable acquaintance, the mag-
nitude of these correlations is quite modest. Thus, on the basis of Table 3,
6Results do not signiﬁcantly change when considering the time interval k = 120.15
it can be argued that the fulﬁllment of the exogeneity condition is gener-
ally met for what concerns explanatory variables employed in the regression
analysis reported below.
3.4 Regression Analysis
The regression analysis provides an estimation of the impact of diﬀerent
explanatory variables on the probability of observing a deposit in the meal
account. The logit estimation presented in Table 4 is based on cross-section
data about the ﬁrst transaction after the introduction of the meal account
technology. Estimations reported in Table 4 are expressed in the odds ratio
format. This provides us with information about the change in the odds of
observing a positive realization of the dependent variable when alternative
realizations of an explanatory variable are observed. Given two possible
realizations for an explanatory variable X, X1 = 1 and X0 = 0, an odds
ratio bigger than 1 implies that odds associated to X1 are bigger than odds
associated to X0. Thus, the probability of observing a positive realization in
the dependent variable is higher among those facing an X = 1 than among
those facing an X = 0.
Table 4 about here
From the estimation reported in Table 4, it clearly emerges that a deposit
of the leader signiﬁcantly increases the odds of observing a deposit of the
follower. The odds of observing a deposit of the follower associated to a
deposit of the leader are almost three times bigger (2.968) than the odds
associated to the alternative choice of the leader. From this it can be argued
that followers tend to conform to observed actions of the leaders.
The odds ratio associated to the interaction between mutual acquain-
tance and the leader’s deposit shows that in the presence of the interaction
the odds of observing a deposit of the follower are more than three times
bigger (3.561) than the estimated odds in the alternative condition. Also in
this case the statistical signiﬁcance of the estimated coeﬃcient is very high.
Thus, the presence of a symmetric social connection between the leader and
the follower strengthens the tendency to replicate observed actions.16
In contrast, the eﬀects of mutual acquaintance are low in magnitude and
not statistically signiﬁcant. This means that the social connection with the
leader does not aﬀect the action of the follower, per s´ e.
Concerning control variables, the following eﬀects are registered. First,
the fact that the transaction happens at the beginning of the week increases
the chances of observing a deposit. Second, males tend to deposit more often.
Third, performing an high number of transactions in the future increases
the likelihood of a deposit today. Finally, being an international student
decreases the chances of depositing on the meal account.
3.4.1 Robustness Check
A robustness check has been performed to provide support to the iden-
tiﬁcation strategy employed. Four diﬀerent combinations of proximity of
decisions (diﬀ) and social connection (h) are considered. A reliable iden-
tiﬁcation structure should capture stronger endogenous social eﬀects when
a more strict deﬁnition of reciprocal knowledge (i.e., higher h) or a lower
time interval between decisions (i.e., lower diff) are considered. Table 5
reports the speciﬁcation of the parameters adopted and the expected con-
sequences on endogenous social eﬀects under the hypothesis of an eﬀective
identiﬁcation strategy.
Table 5 about here
The last column of Table 5 shows the expected direction of the change
in the coeﬃcient of the explanatory variable capturing social eﬀects (i.e.,
Deposit Leader). Speciﬁcation (1) is characterized by a stronger deﬁnition
of mutual acquaintance than in the main regression. In (2) a shorter time in-
terval between decisions is considered. In (3) a longer time interval between
choices in a couple is imposed (i.e., potential absence of visual interaction is
imposed on the estimation). Finally, in (4) a very long distance between de-
cisions of the leader and decisions of the follower and a very loose deﬁnition
of mutual acquaintance is introduced in the estimation.
Table 6 about here17
The following patterns emerge from the comparison between robustness
checks reported in Table 6 and the estimation presented in Table 4. In line
with the prediction of robustness, a stronger positive impact of the deposit
of the leader is registered in parameterization (1) and (2). In addition, the
impact of the same variable decreases in condition (3) and almost vanishes in
estimation (4). Concerning the interaction term, its impact on deposit odds
is positive and highly signiﬁcant in speciﬁcation (1) and (2) and becomes
statistically not signiﬁcant in conditions (3) and (4). The control variables
do not exhibit relevant changes in terms of the direction of the eﬀect across
diﬀerent parameterization. However, some changes are registered in terms
of statistical signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcients.
Overall, the results of the robustness check seem to support the va-
lidity of the identiﬁcation strategy employed. Interestingly, the statistical
signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcient associated with the interaction term vanishes
when a longer time interval between decisions is imposed (i.e., speciﬁcation
(3)). This suggests that interaction eﬀects between actions of non-strangers
depend on visual interaction between the subjects. It follows that the coef-
ﬁcient of the interaction term is likely to capture social eﬀects associated to
exogenous characteristics of the leader and not to shared unobservable fac-
tors. Indeed, the correlation in choices due to shared unobservable factors
(e.g., tastes and motivations) does not require the observation of a fellow’s
choice as it originates from the preference structure of each decision maker.
Thus, the increase in conformist behavior associated to mutual acquaintance
is likely to have its origin in the leader’s exogenous characteristic of being
acquainted with the decision maker. This implies that a stronger motivation
originates from imitation of a socially connected subject than from imitation
of a stranger.
4 Conclusions
In recent years the issue of social interactions has attracted the interest of
economists. However, a reliable identiﬁcation of social spillovers in empir-
ical ﬁeld data is still a diﬃcult task. In this study, a dataset providing a
detailed sequential description of the decision process was employed in order18
to overcome well-known problems of identiﬁcation. Choices analyzed refer
to the deposit of money on a personal account devoted to the of food at a
campus refectory. These choices involve relatively small amounts of wealth.
Nevertheless, they represent an interesting observational unit as they involve
both intertemporal allocation of wealth and nutritional needs. These two
dimensions characterize a large part of the decisions observed in an economic
system. The detailed timing structure associated to individual observations
permits also to identify clusters of individuals who frequently meet in the
queue for lunch at the refectory. The frequency of this kind of meetings was
employed to build a matrix of social proximity. The procedure followed was
supported also by computer simulations.
The identiﬁcation of endogenous social interactions relied on two features
of the dataset: the possibility to control for endogenous matching and the
unidirectional nature of social spillovers. From the identiﬁcation strategy
pursued it emerged that subjects tended to conform to directly observed
deposit acts in the queue for lunch. Moreover, stronger conformism was
observed in couples of non-strangers. The robustness check helped inter-
pret this fostering in imitation among mutually acquainted subjects. When
the distance between decisions was instrumentally increased, the impact of
mutual acquaintance on conformist behavior vanished. If the eﬀect under
examination had been due to correlated unobservable factors, this pattern
should not have been observed. Thus, it seems likely that conformism was
increased by the fact that the decision maker perceived the leader as a non-
stranger and, in addition, directly observed her actions.
Similar ﬁndings are present in the behavioral literature (e.g., Smoski
and Bachorowski, 2003). However, due to its relevance in the ﬁeld of eco-
nomic decision making, the impact of social proximity on imitative behavior
deserves further attention.
Finally, from a methodological point of view, the present work highlights
the opportunity of exploiting ﬁne-grain data sources to estimate endogenous
social interactions which are otherwise diﬃcult to identify. The increasing
diﬀusion of electronic cash may help extend this methodological approach
to other decisions having relevant economic consequences.19
A Tables
Table 1: Deposits: descriptive statistics (k = 60)
N mean sd med
6940 4.278 5.126 2.6
Deposit 791 14.523 10.275 10
No Deposit 6149 2.960 .921 2.620









t 0 4735 (77.00%) 1414 (23.00%) 6149 (100.00%)
(90.85%) (81.83%) (88.60%)
1 477 (60.30%) 314 (39.70%) 791 (100.00%)
(9.15%) (18.17%) (11.40%)
Tot 5212 (75.10%) 1728 (24.90%) 6940 (100.00%)
(100.00%) (100.00%) (100.00%)21
Table 3: Correlations among the explanatory variables (k = 60)
Acquaintance Week Beginning Male Int. Stud.
Week beginning -0.0016
Male 0.0531∗ -0.0360
Int. Student -0.0151 -0.0199 0.0365
Total Transactions 0.357* 0.0326 0.1954* 0.0605*
Spearman’s rho correlations; ∗ = statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level22
Table 4: Logistic Regression Estimation
Deposit Follower Odds Ratio (s.e.)
Deposit Leader 2.968 (0.430)***
Acquaintance 0.987 (0.126)
DL*A. 3.561 (0.813)***
Week beginning 1.306 (0.135)**
Male 1.611 (0.166)***
Int. student 0.263 (0.097)***
Tot. transactions 1.016 (0.002)***
Obs 4871
Prob > chi2 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.1541
∗∗∗(0.1%); ∗∗(1%); ∗(5%) signiﬁcance level23
Table 5: Robustness check - parameters speciﬁcation
Speciﬁcation h diﬀ 4 endog. social eﬀects
(1) 10 < 60 +
(2) 4 < 30 +
(3) 4 > 60 −
(4) 1 > 160 −−24
Table 6: Logistic Regression Estimation: Robustness Check
Odds Ratio (s.e.)
Deposit Follower (1) (2) (3) (4)
Deposit Leader 3.901(0.494)*** 4.457(1.026)*** 1.951(0.316)*** 1.705(0.465)*
Acquaintance 1.110(0.168) 1.072(0.282) 1.129(0.321) 1.317(0.765)
DL*A 2.560(0.651)*** 3.625(1.233)*** 1.559(0.741) 0.555(0.881)
Week beginning 1.306(0.134)*** 1.376(0.217)* 1.222(0.171) 1.294(0.311)
Male 1.588(0.162)*** 1.560(0.241)** 2.167(0.302)*** 2.532(0.605)***
Int. stud. 0.262(0.098)*** 0.109(0.089)** 0.682(0.200) 0.462(0.268)
Tot. transactions 1.016(0.002)*** 1.022(0.003)*** 1.011(0.001)*** 1.008(0.002)**
Obs 4871 2465 2097 696
P > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.1488 0.2204 0.0818 0.0672
∗∗∗(0.1%); ∗∗(1%); ∗(5%) signiﬁcance level25
B Figures
Figure 1: Observational sequence26
Figure 2: Empirical cumulative distribution function of the sum of encoun-
ters of real and simulated distributions of encounters






























Symbol Distribution k Num Average

 real 60 595,208 1.75
4 real 120 1,320,124 1.66
 X2 60 922,500 1.02
× X2 120 1,838,391 1.05
♦ X1 60 444,317 1.01
5 X1 120 917,489 1.0227
References
Aversi, R., Dosi, G., Fagiolo, G., Meacci, M., and Olivetti, C. (1999). De-
mand dynamics with socially evolving preferences. Industrial and Corpo-
rate Change, 8(2), 353–408.
Bala, V. and Goyal, S. (2000). A noncooperative model of network forma-
tion. Econometrica, 5, 1181–1229.
Brock, W. A. and Durlauf, S. N. (2001). Discrete choice with social inter-
actions. Review of Economic Studies, 68, 235–260.
Conley, T. G. and Udry, C. R. (2000). Learning about a new technology:
Pineapple in ghana. Yale University, Economic Growth Center, Discussion
Paper.
Duﬂo, E. and Saez, E. (2002). The role of information and social interactions
in retirment plan decisions. NBER Working Paper No. 8885.
Evans, W. N., Oates, W. E., and Schwab, R. M. (1992). Measuring peer
group eﬀects: A study of teenage behavior. The Journal of Political
Economy, 100(5), 966–991.
Galef, B. G. J. (1996). Social enhancement of food preferences in norway
rats: a brief review. In H. C. M. and B. G. J. Galef, editors, Social
Learning and Imitation in Animals, pages 49–64. New York: Academic
Press.
Glaeser, E. and Scheinkman, J. A. (2003). Advances in Economics and
Econometrics: Theory and Applications, Eight World Congress, chapter
Nonmarket interactions, pages 339–369. Massachusets: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press.
Glaeser, E. L., Sacerdote, B., and Scheinkman, J. A. (1996). Crime and
social interaction. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 111(2), 507–
548.
Granovetter, M. (1985). Economic action and social action: The problem
of embeddedness. The American Journal of Sociology, 91, 481–510.28
Henrich, J. and McElreath, R. (2003). The evolution of cultural evolution.
Evolutionary Anthropology, 12, 123–135.
Iacoboni, M., Woods, R. P., Brass, M., Bekkering, H., Mazziotta, J. C., and
Rizzolati, G. (1999). Cortical mechanisms of human imitation. Science,
286, 2526–2528.
Ioannides, Y. M. and Datcher Loury, L. (2004). Job Information Networks,
Neighborhood Eﬀects, and Inequality. Journal of Economic Literature,
XLII, 1056–1093.
Manski, C. F. (1993). Identiﬁcation of endogenous social eﬀects: The reﬂec-
tion problem. The Review of Economic Studies, 60(3), 531–542.
Manski, C. F. (2000). Economic analysis of social interaction. The Journal
of Economic Perspectives, pages 115–136.
Miguel, E. and Kremer, M. (2003). Networks, social learning, and technology
adoption: The case of deworming drugs in kenya. Working Paper.
O’Donoghue and Rabin, M. (2000). The economics of immediate gratiﬁca-
tion. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 13(2), 233–250.
Sacerdote, B. (2001). Peer eﬀects with random assignment: Results for
Dartmouth Roommates. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116(2),
681–704.
Schelling, T. S. (1973). Hockey helmets, concealed weapons, and daylight
saving. The Journal of Conﬂict Resolution, 17(3), 381–428.
Smoski, M. J. and Bachorowski, J.-A. (2003). Antiphonal laughter between
friends and stranger. Cognition and Emotion, 17(2), 327–340.
Soetevent, A. R. (2006). Empirics of the Identiﬁcation of Social Interactions:
An Evaluation of the Approaches and Their Results. Journal of Economic
Surveys, 20(2), 193–228.
Sorensen, A. T. (200x). Social learning and health plan choice. RAND
Journal of Economics. forthcoming.29
Subiaul, F., Cantlon, J. F., Holloway, R., and Terrace, R. S. (2004). Cogni-
tive imitation in rhesus macaques. Science, 305, 407–410.
Tajfel, H. and Turner, J. C. (1986). The social identity theory of inter-
group behavior. In S. Worchel and W. G. Austin, editors, Psychology of
Intergroup Relations, chapter 1. Nelson-Hall, 2nd edition.
Turner, J. C. (1985). Social categorisation and the self-concept: a social
cogitive theory of group behavior. In C. J. P. Greenwich, editor, Advances
in Group Processes: Theory and Research, volume 2.
Witt, U. (2001). Economic growth - what happens on the demand side?
introduction. Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 11, 1–5.